We evaluate the role of embodiment in ordinary mental state ascriptions. Presented are five experiments on phenomenal state ascriptions to disembodied entities such as ghosts and spirits.
experiment is to demonstrate that it could not. In fact, Block finds it doubtful that we will say that the "China-Brain" has any mental states at all-least of all any "qualitative states, raw feels, or immediate phenomenological qualities" (p. 281). It simply is not made of the right stuff for such states to be possible. This intuition has been taken by some as evidence against the claim that certain theories of functionalism adequately capture how the mind works.
The significance of Block's thought experiment has been debated. But the basic example has remained influential in both psychology and cognitive science. Much the same could be said for both the original purpose and subsequent legacy of Searle's "Chinese Room" argument (1980) with respect to the questions of function and embodiment.
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sions of a view that we will call the embodiment hypothesis (Knobe 2008 , Knobe & Prinz 2008 , Gray et al. 2011 . Generally speaking the embodiment hypothesis states that unified biological embodiment is a major psychological factor that cues ordinary attribution of experiences, feelings, emotions, and so on, to other entities. The strongest version of this view is that phenomenal attribution requires biological embodiment. Weaker versions focus on relative levels of attribution, claiming that phenomenal attributions are more likely to be cued as an entity's biological body becomes more salient.
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To begin to get a sense of why many have been drawn to the embodiment hypothesis, it may be helpful to consider a specific example of some work on the role of embodiment on mental state ascriptions to different sorts of entities. For instance, in their work studying people's intuitions about group agents, Knobe & Prinz (2008) observe:
It is a striking fact about group agents that we ascribe to them some types of mental states but not others. We might 2 We use the terms 'phenomenal consciousness' and 'phenomenal attribution' throughout the paper when referring to states typically classified by philosophers as qualitative states or states of subjective experience. However there are some doubts in the experimental philosophy of mind literature concerning whether people have the concept of phenomenal consciousness (see Sytsma & Machery 2010) . We emphasize that none of our main arguments or findings here depend on whether or not non-philosophers draw the phenomenal/non-phenomenal distinction when ascribing experiences, feelings or emotions to disembodied entities, and set the issue aside. We thank Justin Sytsma for discussion on this point.
say that Microsoft intends something or wants something or believes something…but there are other kinds of ascriptions that we would never make to Microsoft. For example, we would never say that Microsoft was feeling depressed. (p. 73) Knobe & Prinz conduct several studies and find that this is indeed the case. People are very reluctant to ascribe states like feeling depressed to the Microsoft Corporation. They go on to explain this striking fact by appealing to two claims. The first claim is that there are important differences in how people ascribe intentional states (like intending or wanting) on the one hand, and states requiring phenomenal consciousness (like feeling sad or depressed) on the other. The second claim is that attributions of these latter kinds of mental states are "sensitive in a special way to information about physical constitution" (p. 73). clearly lacks a biological body. So while it has a body in some extended sense, it lacks a unified body comprised, among other things, of flesh and blood. According to Knobe and Prinz, we are reluctant to attribute phenomenal states or subjective experiences to the Microsoft Corporation because Microsoft lacks the right kind of unified biological body.
4
As far as we know, the embodiment hypothesis about folk psychological judgments has not been endorsed by Block or other traditional philosophers of mind directly. Knobe & Prinz (2008) argue for the hypothesis insofar as facts about physical constitution can explain low phenomenal state ascriptions to group agents. Knobe (2008) and Gray et al. (2011) argue for the hypothesis on the grounds that body salience correlates with higher attributions of phenomenal capacities.
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But leaving aside questions of exactly who has endorsed specific versions of the embodiment view, we note that work by Block, Knobe, and others has made the general embodiment hypothesis a very attractive view that theorists in both psychology and philosophy of mind might be tempted to accept.
The general view that unified biological embodiment is a major psychological factor that cues ordinary attribution of experiences, feel-4 Knobe and Prinz seem to focus on the disunity of corporate entities as the crucial factor, since one of their later studies suggests that an enchanted chair with a unified "body" can have phenomenal states.
This work focuses on the psychological cues for the attribution of mental capacities, while the experiments we present below focus on the cues for attribution of specific mental states. More research is needed to study the subtle differences between these two closely related research questions.
ings, emotions, and so on seems to fit some of the data that has been collected across a number of influential studies on mental state ascription. The view would predict that entities with the right kind of biological body are the ones typically thought capable of having phenomenally conscious experiential states. And conversely it holds that entities without the right kind of biological body, such as robots, groups, and ghosts, are typically attributed phenomenal mental states at only very low levels. Furthermore, the embodiment view would be one way of explaining the psychological basis of intuitions such as those in Block's original thought experiment, which some philosophers have used as evidence for key philosophical conclusions in the metaphysics of mind. Nonetheless, we think that philosophers and psychologists should be slow to accept the general embodiment view. Some of the key thought experiments and empirical studies that have been presented to date suggest that embodiment actually does not play that important of a role in the way we ordinarily attribute mental states. Specifically, a number of philosophers and cognitive scientists sympathetic to functional accounts of the mind have suggested that intuitions favouring embodiment in both thought experiments, like Block's China Brain, as well as empirical studies on mental state ascription might in fact be trading on subtle cues and distrac-6 After all, the nation of China is one (special kind) of group entity. (Though see Phelan et al., forthcoming, for an independent source of resistance to thinking that groups really have minds.) tions related to the functional organization of the target entities.
On the philosophical side, Dennett (1991) , for example, argues that "China-Brain" does not constitutes an acceptable counterexample to functionalism. Instead, he argues that Block's thought experiment unfairly relies on a "misdirection of the imagination" because it nonchalantly invites readers to buy into the unlikely idea that the China-brain is complex enough to satisfy the functional roles associated with particular mental states. And similarly, on the empirical side, we have argued elsewhere (Phelan and Buckwalter, forthcoming) , that many of the experimental materials researchers have used to study the influence of embodiment on mental state ascriptions include potential confounds. For example, many include subtle but crucial functional descriptions of entities and their environments (e.g., information about inputs, outputs, and other mental states to which the entities are subject). In addition to considerations about unified biological embodiment, the inclusion of these potential confounds makes it difficult to assess existing research purported to support the embodiment hypothesis.
Before continuing, it may be helpful to pause and consider how functional information might influence mental state ascriptions. Suppose, for instance, someone was trying to figure out whether or not an entity (let's call this entity 'Bob') feels happiness or anger about some state of affairs (such as current low interest rates). In assessing whether Bob is happy or angry about low interest rates, information about Bob's other mental states will be im-portant. Bob is more likely to be happy if he wants to borrow a large sum of money; more likely to be angry if he wants to make money as a lender. Our assessment of Bob's emotional state will also be affected by our beliefs concerning the external stimuli to which Bob is subject. If for instance Bob is angry about the low rates, but then hears a newscast that they've just increased, we will likely temper our assessment of Bob's anger accordingly. Finally, Bob's overt behavior will factor into our assessment of his mental states. If we see Bob cursing or tearing up his lender's agreement, we will be more likely to conclude Bob is angry over the low interest rates. It strikes us as obvious that such functional information contributes to mental state assessment. Indeed, we have shown in prior work that people often consult these kinds of cues when deciding whether or not to ascribe phenomenal states (Buckwalter and Phelan, 2012) .
Of course, even if functional information of this sort does cue phenomenal state attributions, it could still be that embodiment (for instance, whether 'Bob' is a normal human being, a group, or an immaterial ghost) constitutes an important ascription cue as well. However, we think there are good reasons to reject the embodiment hypothesis. This is what we will attempt to demonstrate.
In the remainder of this paper, we examine people's ascriptions of experiential states to entities lacking a biological body. Our goal is to see if ascriptions of phenomenal states to these sorts of entities differ from ascriptions made about normal human beings, or if they tend to work in the same basic way.
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For this task, a number of different disembodied entities might have been used. We chose to begin our examination of disembodied ascription with the phantasmally disembodied-ghosts and spirits. Lacking in any body whatsoever, spirits constitute the ultimate test of the embodiment view. If the embodiment hypothesis were correct, and embodiment were a crucial cue for phenomenal state attribution, then we would expect important differences in ascription between human beings, on the one hand, and disembodied ghosts and spirits, on the other-just as we expect to find important differences in phenomenal state attribution for functional information. If functional information-information about the goals, desires, etc, of an entity-tends to cue mental state ascription independently of whether the entity has a unified biological body, then it undermines the embodiment hypothesis. This is what we set out to investigate, using spirits as our medium.
Previous Studies on Mental State Attributions to Disembodied Entities
We are under no illusion that our investigation into how people attribute mental states to the disembodied is unprecedented. Several influential studies on God and ghosts have already been conducted. On the other hand, findings from Jesse Bering and colleagues could be interpreted as challenging the embodiment view.
Bering found that adults thought psychological functions-including emotional states-continued after biological death in an agent killed on his daily commute (2002). Bering and Bjorklund (2004) 7
Note however that Gray & Wegner (2010) question whether these prior findings about God are best interpreted as supporting embodiment. These are not criticisms of Bering's work, since he wasn't out to investigate the issue of physical realizers at all. In fact, Bering is one of a number of theorists arguing for a particular view about the source of afterlife beliefs, which Bering (2011) calls the simulation constraint hypothesis. Nichols (2007) , another proponent of the view, encapsulates the basic idea as follows: "part of the reason we believe in immortality is that we can't imagine our own nonexistence" (p. 216). Interesting as the connections are between the embodiment hypothesis and afterlife belief, we set them aside.
participants literally attribute the same phenomenal states to disembodied ghosts and spirits as they attribute to ordinary human beings.
Experiment 1: Disembodied Ghost

Methods
We begin with a between-subjects multifactor experiment designed to test the influence of embodiment and functional cues on ascriptions of phenomenal states. After reading one of the versions above, half of the participants saw a conclusion to the story where Bob's biological body is made salient:
[EMBODIED] On the drive over however, Bob is in a car accident. Bob emerges from his car and looks over his body.
Everything seems to be completely fine-his head, legs and arms. But even though Bob has been in an accident, he won't let that deter him from his earlier goal. He takes the pictures out of his car and walks them over to Melissa's house. He carries them over the back fence and into the treehouse, where Henry is sure to see them.
The remaining participants saw a conclusion to the story where Bob had no biological -let alone physical -body at all:
[DISEMBODIED] On the drive over however, Bob is in a fatal car accident and is killed instantly. Bob emerges from his dead body as a ghost. He now has no form at all-no head, no legs, no arms. Instead, he is something like an invisible force or a spiritual presence. Though he has no limbs with which to touch physical objects, Bob can make objects move without touching them, by floating them through the air. But even though Bob is a ghost, he won't let that deter him from his earlier goal. He causes the pictures to rise out of his car and to float towards Melissa's house. He moves them over the back fence and into the treehouse, where Henry is sure to see them.
All participants were then asked to rate their level of agreement with the following three statements regarding what Bob both felt and believed at the end of the story:
Belief. As Bob moves the pictures into place, he believes Henry will find them in the treehouse after school.
Feel Anger. As Bob moves the pictures into place, he feels angry at Melissa for beginning a new relationship.
Feel Happiness. As Bob moves the pictures into place, he feels happy for Melissa for beginning a new relationship.
Responses were collected on the same seven-item scale anchored with positive and negative agreement terms designed to measure people's willingness to attribute these intentional states (Belief) and experiential states (Feel Anger and Feel Happiness) to Bob.
Results and Discussion
We made three main predictions. A large body of prior empirical work has demonstrated that the behavior displayed by an entity is a crucial factor that cues attributions of intentional states to that en-tity (Heider & Simmel 1944 bars) seemed to play no role in people's willingness to ascribe these mental states to Bob at the end of the story.
On the other hand, functional cues ( Fig.1: dark 
Experiment 2: Disembodied Ghost Lacking Intentional Objects
The findings from Experiment 1 begin to motivate the following conclusions. First, when it comes to entities like disembodied souls, having or lacking a human biological body is not utilized as an important cue when attributing phenomenal consciousness. In fact, this information seemed to play no role in people's judgments.
Second, participants strongly agreed by comparison that certain en- tities-embodied or not-can have experiential states when provided with appropriate functional information.
Regarding the first point however, one immediate objection surfaces. Prior work in experimental philosophy of mind has suggested that participants' agreement with phenomenal state attributions are highly sensitive to the amount of contextual information given within experimental probes. Specifically, Arico (2010) found that attributions of phenomenal states to groups that specified an intentional object (e.g., "Canada's Travel Bureau is experiencing a sudden urge to pursue internet advertising") were deemed significantly more acceptable than attributions of phenomenal states to groups that lacked an intentional object (e.g. "Canada's Travel Bureau is experiencing a sudden urge"). In fact, people were much less likely to agree that groups could have a series of phenomenal states when intentional clauses were absent. Thus Arico suggested that that the inclusion of an intentional object in experimental probes provides contextual information that can bias phenomenal ascriptions.
Perhaps a similar effect could explain the high ascriptions of phenomenal states to disembodied entities in Experiment 1. It could be that participants attributed emotional states to Bob because the probes that were used included intentional clauses, (e.g.
"he feels angry at Melissa for beginning a new relationship" vs. "he feels angry"). These clauses might have served to bias disembodied phenomenal state attributions. We conducted our second experi-ment to rule out this possibility of bias in the probe design.
Methods
Participants in Experiment 2 (N=147, 53 female, median age = 32)
where presented with the same stimulus material combinations as participants in Experiment 1. However after seeing the vignettes, they were asked to rate their agreement with the following three sentences.
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These sentences were adjusted to account for the worries above by removing the intentional objects from the probe, thereby limiting the potentially biasing contextual information presented:
Intention. Bob intends to move the pictures into place.
Feel Anger No Object. As he moves the pictures into place, Bob feels angry.
Feel Happiness No Object. As he moves the pictures into place, Bob feels happy.
Responses were collected on the same seven-item scale anchored with positive and negative agreement terms.
Results and Discussion
We made two predictions. Our first prediction was that we would replicate each of the results uncovered in Experiment 1. Our second prediction was that the absence of the intentional phrases and potentially biasing contextual information in the phenomenal state probes in Experiment 2 ("he feels angry" vs. "he feels angry at 15 For the sake of uniformity in removing intentional objects, we switched the intentional state tested in Experiment 2 from believes to intends.
Melissa for beginning a new relationship") would not result in lower rates of phenomenal state ascription to the disembodied entities in the story.
Both of these predictions were borne out. First, Experiment 2 replicated each effect found in Experiment 1.
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Once again, participants overwhelmingly attributed Intention across the board. Error bars +/-SE.
Thus Experiment 2 suggests that Arico's results for contextual information bias for group ascriptions do not extend to phenomenal state ascriptions to disembodied entities such as ghosts. In fact, when the intentional object of the phenomenal state probes are dropped in Experiment 2, we again see a clear demonstration of the role that functional information is playing in people's judgments to these entities.
Experiment 3: Eternally Disembodied Spirits
Taken together, Experiments 1-2 directly challenge the embodiment hypothesis. But one worry about the entities in these experiments is that participants might be conceiving of them as nearly embodied.
After all, Bob did not always lack a unified biological body; he was until very recently a normal human being. So perhaps temporal proximity to unified biological embodiment affects people's judgments about the states they attribute to Bob. It could be that there are specific norms related to the genre of ghost stories such that the ghosts of the recently deceased are attributed phenomenal states because they recently possessed human bodies.
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To rule out these possibilities we conducted Experiment 3 to see if we could replicate the previous results for entities with no temporal proximity to being normal human beings. For this, we turn to spirits that have never been human, or are eternally disembodied.
Methods
Experiment 3 mirrored the same between-subjects multifactorial design in Experiments 1-2. Participants (N=118, 41 female, median age = 30) were presented with cases designed to study the effect of embodiment and functional cues on mental state attribution, this time using an entity that was more purely disembodied. For roughly half of the participants, the story started like this:
[EMBODIED] Fintan is a very private person. He has little connection with the outside world-no computer, no phone, no car. Instead, he hunts or grows his own food with his bare 19 We thank Aaron Meskin for discussion on this point. For more on this point about the kinds of bodies ghosts might be assumed to have see discussion in Section 4 below.
hands. Though he has no money with which to buy tools, Fintan can make many useful objects with the things he finds around him.
The other half saw a story that began as follows:
[DISEMBODIED] Fintan is a nature spirit. He has no form at all -no head, no legs, no arms. Instead, he has always existed as a kind of invisible force or a spiritual presence. Though he has no limbs with which to touch physical objects, Fintan can make objects move without touching them, by floating them through the air.
Both groups then saw the story continue: Lastly, to manipulate the functional information specified, participants saw one of two conclusions to the story:
that there is nothing he can do to stop the loggers, Fintan leaves Dirk's Wood. He must now find another place to call home.
[HAPPY] Eventually the construction company gives in.
Realizing that he has stopped the loggers, Fintan returns to Dirk's Wood. The place he calls home is now safe.
All participants were then asked the following three questions:
Comprehension. In the story above, Fintan is: [A human being/A nature spirit with no physical body]
Feel Sadness. At the end of the story, Fintan feels sad.
Feel Happiness. At the end of the story, Fintan feels happy.
Phenomenal state ascription was collected on the same seven-item agreement scale used in Experiments 1-2.
Results and Discussion
We made three predictions in Experiment 3. First, we predicted a strong effect for function, whereby people will be much more likely to agree with Feel Sadness rather than Feel Happiness for SAD, and And lastly, these results again persisted despite using phenomenal state probes lacking intentional objects. These findings are displayed in Figure 3 Error bars +/-SE.
Experiment 4: Eternally Disembodied Spirits-An Alternative Measure
One worry about Experiments 1-3 is that they all use the same basic technique for collecting phenomenal state attributions, in which participants were asked two questions about states of opposite valence. But perhaps presenting these two questions together created some undue pressure to ascribe phenomenal states. With this worry in mind, we conducted Experiment 4 using a different measure for state attribution based on confidence judgments.
Methods
Participants in Experiment 4 (N=120, 37 female, median age = 28)
were presented with the same stimulus materials as Experiment 3.
However after seeing the materials, they were asked a different set of questions:
Attitude Ascription. Which do you think best describes Fintan at the end of the story? [Fintan feels sad/Fintan feels happy]
Attitude Confidence. How confident are you with the answer you gave to the previous question?
Participants answered Attitude Ascription with dichotomous answer choices above. They answered Attitude Confidence on a seven-item scale where "1" was anchored with "Not at all Confident" and "7" was anchored with "Extremely Confident". Attitude Ascription was then recoded ("-1" for feels sad, and "+1" for feels happy) and multiplied by Attitude Confidence to create a combined ascription/confidence score (ranging from -7 to +7) for each of the entities in the various combinations of cases.
Results and Discussion
We predicted that this alternative measuring technique in Experiment 4 would still result in the same basic findings as seen in Ex- Confidence) for each type of entity grouped by function. Scores run from (-7) to (7). Error bars +/-SE.
Experiment 5: Spirits, Groups, and Humans-Explicit Emotional Comparisons
The previous experiments appear to demonstrate that people often ascribe emotional states to disembodied entities without hesitation -so long as the appropriate functional cues are present. But then again, how can we be sure that participants are applying the phrase "feels sad" to a disembodied entity as they would to a normal human? Perhaps people merely say that the spirit feels sad, but mean
something different than what they mean when they say a human being is sad. In other words, they might not literally attribute the state of sadness to a sprit in the same way they do to a normal human being. In that case, let's say they make an anti-realist ascription.
To ensure that participants are literally ascribing phenomenal states in both cases, we need evidence that when people ascribe emotional states to ghosts and spirits, they mean to attribute the same emotional states they attribute to other human beings when they make similar ascriptions. In other words, we need evidence of realist ascriptions. In our fifth study, we set out to provide such evidence.
As recent experimental work on quantity implicatures (in addition to other work in experimental pragmatics) demonstrates, it is often very difficult to experimentally uncover what people mean by (or how they interpret) particular sentences.
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However, our task is at least somewhat less daunting since we do not need to uncover what people ultimately mean when they say a spirit is sad. We simply need to demonstrate that people generally mean the same thing by "sad" when they say, for instance, "a spirit is sad" as they do when they say "a person is sad". There may be numerous ways of examining this question. But one straightforward way is just to ask people to evaluate their mental state ascriptions comparatively. In other words, we could simply ask those who ascribed emotional states to the spirits how similar the emotional states they meant to attribute were to the emotional states they would attribute to a nor-
See Noveck and Reboul (2008) for a useful review.
mal person.
Of course, we would expect some variance in individual responses to this question, so we would need to compare responses to a similar question asked of those who more or less agreed with emotional state ascriptions to the human character in our stories as well. And since we were predicting no difference between people's interpretations of emotion words for the spirit or the man, we would also need some other entity to serve as a control, some entity to which people are willing to ascribe emotional states at the verbal level, but to which they do not really mean to attribute exactly the same emotional states they attribute to normal persons.
For this, we turn again to prior work in the experimental philosophy of mind on group ascriptions. Specifically, Phelan et al. (2012) found that people often offer anti-realist phenomenal state ascriptions to group entities (e.g. the Boeing Corporation). Phelan et al. (2012) argue that phenomenal state ascriptions to groups are often distributivist, or that people ascribe states to individual group members rather than to the group as a whole over and above its members.
we reexamine participants' judgments by asking for explicit comparisons between different emotional states of humans, disembodied spirits, and group entities.
Methods
Participants (N=194, 75 female, median age = 26) read vignettes similar to those used in Experiments 3-4. Each vignette began with the introduction of a protagonist that was either a spirit, a human, or a group:
[SPIRIT] Fintan is a nature spirit who strives to protect local forests and rivers. He has no form at all-no head, no legs, no arms. Instead, he has always existed as a kind of invisible force or a spiritual presence. Though he has no limbs with which to touch physical objects, Fintan can make objects move without touching them, by floating them through the air. He uses his spiritual abilities to bring an active approach to nature preservation.
[HUMAN] Fintan is an individual who strives to protect local forests and rivers. Through hard work and tireless efforts, Fintan works to protect natural areas from development.
Though he has little money with which to support his cause, Fintan exploits his own significant technical skills to bring an active approach to nature preservation.
[GROUP] FINTAN is an organization set up to protect local forests and rivers. Through charitable donations and the efforts of group members, FINTAN works to protect natural areas from development. Not only does FINTAN support conservation legislation, it also exploits the technical skills of members to bring an active approach to nature preservation.
All participants then read a short description of the character's struggle against a development project, for the spirit it read as fol- SPIRIT.
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Results for Comparison are shown in Figure 5 below: These results suggest that people think of the emotional states they attribute to disembodied entities in the same way as they think of the emotional states they attribute to human beings. In other words, this is evidence that they think these states are similar to the 27 A 2 (Emotional State) x 3 (Entity Type) between-subjects analysis of variance reveals a main effect for the factor Entity Type, F (2, 173) = 10.29 p < 0.001. No other effects were detected. A Tukey HSD test revealed significant differences for people's interpretations of emotional state attributions between GROUP and both SPIRIT (p = 0.001) and HUMAN (p = 0.001). However, no significant difference emerged for HUMAN and SPIRIT (p = 0.897). Six participants were removed for failing Comprehension.
emotional states of normal people. And they think these states are somewhat dissimilar from the emotional states they attribute to groups. Lastly, recall that the embodiment hypothesis predicted that people would be thinking about groups and disembodied spirits in the same way. But it turns out that we see very different results when using our realist measure for comparing ascriptions to these two types of entities.
Feeling Beyond Embodiment
Our experiments suggest that people are perfectly willing to ascribe emotional states to disembodied entities (ghosts and spirits).
Though we think more experiments need to be conducted pursuing the question of realist ascription, we think that these results are a promising first step towards the conclusion that findings across Experiments 1-5 constitute strong evidence against the embodiment view. It appears that people really do think that under the right conditions, disembodied entities can have the same kinds of emotional states as human beings. What's more, the data from study 5 suggest that people think of emotional state ascriptions to disembodied entities in the same way as they think of emotional state ascriptions to human beings.
Of course, even though participants explicitly state that entities like Fintan are disembodied, it could be that there are specific cultural or social norms which nonetheless suggest that all spirits occupy a location, and thus must possess a body in some indeterminate or minimal sense.
28
Indeed there probably is such a sense in which spirits have bodies, much like there is some mitigated sense in which group entities like Microsoft have bodies. We would only point out that the crucial question -and perhaps the feature that attracted many to the embodiment hypothesis in the first placewas whether or not phenomenal ascriptions are cued in light of possessing a unified biological body like our own. It is unclear whether the minimal or indeterminate sense in which ghosts might be assumed to have bodies meets with these criteria.
We should also point out that while we found strong evidence for phenomenal state ascriptions to entities lacking unified biological bodies, embodiment could still have a relative impact on ascription. In other words, it's possible that people attribute more, or will be more likely to attribute certain phenomenal states or mental capacities to entities as considerations about the body become more salient.
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While this continues to be a possibility note that in our experiments we found extremely similar rates of ascription between embodied and disembodied entities. If embodiment made any kind of minimal incremental difference on phenomenal ascription, we did not detect it across our experiments. In contrast, we present strong evidence for the distinct and central role that function plays in ordinary judgments.
28
We thank Joshua Weisberg for discussion on this point.
29
We thank Shaun Nichols for discussion on this point.
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These results corroborate previous research by Buckwalter & Phelan on the important-otherworldly even-role that functional information has on the ascription of phenomenal states to diverse sorts of entities. Completely independently of any influence for body, information about perceptual stimuli, behavioral responses, and other mental states is accompanied by strong attribution of phenomenal states, including, as discussed here, emotional states.
One straightforward explanation of this fact is that folk psychology actually identifies phenomenal states with functional roles. This is an interesting question to be pursued in future research on phenomenality and functional role. However for our current purposes, what we find striking is that people's judgments were highly sensitive to functional role in exactly the same manner for both entities with or without unified biological bodies. We conclude that when it comes to the psychological factors that cue people's actual attributions of phenomenal states to ghosts, perhaps the only apparition here is the embodiment hypothesis itself.
Returning now to the "Nation of China" thought experiment, it could be that Block's basic insight about what is ultimately required for phenomenal consciousness is still more or less on the right track. After all, the experiments we conducted only speak to the principles of folk psychology that guide ordinary ascriptions of phenomenal states. They don't rule out the metaphysical possibility that cognition requires some sort of embodiment. While this remains a possibility, we would only note that part of the argument
